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 ASPECTS OF PSYCHOLOGISM1 IS A collec-
tion of essays unified around a philosophical 
approach to the mind that is non-reductive 
and yet compatible (or continuous) with sci-
entific psychology. The essays in the book, 
published over a period of twenty years, in-
vestigate the phenomena of intentionality 
and consciousness, with a special emphasis 
on perceptual phenomena. The central 
theme which unites the essays is an approach 
to the mind which I call “psychologism about 
the psychological”. 
Psychologism about the psychological, as 
I understand it, is a vision of what is im-
portant in the study of the mind. It asserts 
the reality of the psychological and the need 
to investigate it through a variety of ap-
proaches, of which metaphysics, psychology, 
cognitive science and phenomenology are ex-
amples. These disciplines, according to psy-
chologism, are concerned with fundamental-
ly the same subject-matter: the mind. But 
since I have found it difficult sometimes to 
get this point across in abstract terms, per-
haps it is easier to introduce what I mean by 
“psychologism” by saying what it is not. 
The last fifty or so years of analytic phi-
losophy of mind have been dominated by 
two problems: the problem of consciousness 
and the problem of intentionality. Both of 
these problems have been framed against the 
background of a physicalist or materialist 
metaphysics: the problems are about how 
physicalism or materialism can account for 
consciousness and intentionality. But there is 
a prior question: how should consciousness 
and intentionality be conceived?  
A crude description of the philosophical 
answers of the last fifty years to this question 
is this: consciousness should be understood 
in terms of qualia, and intentionality in 
terms of the propositional attitudes, mental 
states thought to be relations to abstract enti-
ties called “propositions”. My psychologism 
rejects both these answers. 
The best way to understand this rejection 
is to consider the usual approach to the prop-
ositional attitudes. I think it is fair to say that 
the investigation of the propositional attitudes 
in the last few decades has progressed by look-
ing at the semantic form or structure of natu-
ral language propositional attitude ascriptions, 
and has read off from these ascriptions claims 
about the psychological nature of intentionali-
ty. This is the only way to understand the per-
vasive claim that intentional states are “rela-
tions to propositions”.  
A much more natural thought – although 
one I ultimately reject – is that intentional 
states are relations to things in the world: the 
objects around us and their properties. The 
idea that intentional states are relations to 
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propositions is something that takes quite a 
lot of theorising to get to. 
But the origin of this idea derives from 
certain core assumptions of the 20th century 
semantic tradition: the idea that judgment or 
belief has a certain priority in understanding 
language and therefore thought, that mean-
ing is compositional, that propositions must 
be mind-independent, that thought must ul-
timately be communicable, and so on. The 
semantic tradition stemming from Frege has 
understood intentionality in terms of linguis-
tic meaning, and meaning in terms of the 
proposition. It is the ideas of this tradition 
applied to the study of the mind which my 
psychologism rejects. 
The most vivid way of explaining this re-
jection is by using an analogy Frege himself 
used in On Sense and Reference, to illustrate 
the difference between reference, sense and 
what he called associated idea (Vorstellung, 
sometimes translated into English as “repre-
sentation”). Consider someone who looks at 
the moon through a telescope. «I compare 
the moon itself to the reference», Frege 
writes, «it is the object of the observation, 
mediated by the real image projected by the 
object glass in the interior of the telescope, 
and by the retinal image of the observer. The 
former I compare to the sense, the latter is 
like the idea or the experience».2  
The semantic tradition has concentrated 
on understanding the mind-world interface in 
terms of sense and reference. The references 
of our words are out there, in the world, and 
sense inhabits Frege’s famous “third realm” of 
abstract entities. Thoughts – the senses of 
whole sentences – are what is communicated 
when all goes well. 
It is impossible to exaggerate how influen-
tial this picture has been in analytic philoso-
phy. Even for those philosophers, and there 
are many of them, who reject Frege’s own the-
ory of the proposition, and sense and refer-
ence, the picture of intentionality as consisting 
of relations to abstract propositions has the 
whole discipline in its grip. And even for those 
who claim to want to integrate the theory of 
mind with the theory of language, and to ex-
plain the latter in terms of the former, the an-
ti-psychologistic strains run very deep.  
Gareth Evans’s The Varieties of Reference, 
for example, makes a big deal of the idea that 
«an understanding of how singular thoughts 
are related to objects is essential for a proper 
treatment of the linguistic devices by which 
such thoughts are expressed».3 And yet the 
first three chapters are about some of the se-
mantic views of Frege, Russell and Kripke. The 
starting point of Evans’s investigation is Frege’s 
semantic theory, not his conjecture about ideas. 
If I could sum up my psychologism in a 
phrase, then, it would be this: the study of 
intentionality, and therefore the study of the 
mind, should begin with what Frege called 
“ideas” and not with his concepts of sense 
and reference, or related notions.  
Aspects of Psychologism consists of an intro-
ductory essay plus fifteen more, divided into 
four parts: History, Intentionality, Perception 
and Consciousness. The introductory essay 
elaborates on the conception of psychologism 
just sketched, and argues for a specific version 
of psychologism about intentional content.  
The historical essays in Part I discuss three 
aspects of the history of philosophical discus-
sions of intentionality: the re-introduction of 
the terminology of intentionality by Brentano 
in 1874, Wittgenstein’s attempts to dissolve 
the problems of intentionality, and the rela-
tionship between intentionality and con-
sciousness (in terms of the notion of “qualia”). 
Part II contains four essays on intention-
ality, the central concept of my psycholo-
gistic conception of the mind. Psychologism 
holds that the mind forms a unified subject-
matter, and intentionalism is the view that 
the subject-matter is unified by intentionali-
ty: the direction of the mind upon its objects. 
What this means is developed in these essays. 
The essays in Part III discuss the inten-
tionality of perception. I have argued that per-
ception is in a certain sense nonconceptual, 
and also that it has intentional content which 
is not propositional. I now think of these 
claims as underpinned by psychologism, in the 
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way explained in essay 12, The Given.  
Part IV contains four essays on conscious-
ness, which make contributions to a number of 
the central debates in the recent philosophy of 
consciousness. The essays in this section are 
mostly negative: they criticise some of the or-
thodox ideas in terms of which the “problem of 
consciousness” is sometimes understood. The 
ideas criticised are: that there is a meaningful 
distinction between conscious and unconscious 
belief; that the knowledge argument is a threat 
to physicalism; and that notions of “phenome-




































tions to use in understanding consciousness. 
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